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Abstract
We study a simple two period economy with no uncertainty and complete markets
where agents trade based on forecasts about the second period spot price. We
propose as our solution concept a set of forecasts with the following properties: there
exist (heterogenous) forecasts contained in this set that lead to e¢ cient allocations,
the set contains only those forecasts that correspond to some e¢ cient equilibrium,
and nally that the forecasts assign positive probability to the actual market clearing
spot price. We call such a set of prices an e¢ cient equilibrium with ambiguity,
and interpret it as a generalization of Radner equilibrium that delivers e¢ cient
allocations under forecasts that possess a self-fullling property that is weaker than
perfect foresight.
JEL classication numbers : D51, D53, D61
1 Introduction
Walrasian trade in intertemporal economies require households to forecast prices that
will prevail in spot markets at future dates. The ubiquitous nancial equilibrium model
that is used to address this aspect of intertemporal economies is the one proposed by
Radner (1972) (following Arrow (1963)) and is the bedrock of modern treatments of
Visiting Professor, Singapore Management University. Kajii acknowledges support from JSPS Grant-
in-aid for scientic research (S)18H05217 and (A)16H02026, Open Research Area (ORA) for the Social
Sciences 2018, and Nomura Foundation Research Grant for the Frontier of Research into Finance and
Securities, Central Banks Communication with the Public and Economic Fluctuations".
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general equilibrium. This resulting Radner equilibrium (henceforth, RE), postulates that
households correctly anticipate all spot prices at future dates; a RE is accordingly an
equilibrium with perfect foresight (henceforth, PFE), where the forecasts of heterogenous
households are perfectly aligned.
Consider a simple two period environment with no uncertainty. An important im-
plication of perfect foresight is that with one nancial asset, say a nominal bond, the
market structure is equivalent to a model with complete markets. Therefore, a RE de-
livers an e¢ cient allocation. Earlier work (Chatterji, Kajii and Zeng (2018a, 2018b),
Chatterji and Kajii (2020)) has shown that the e¢ ciency of equilibrium does not dictate
that forecasts have to perfectly aligned and self-fullling, that is, perfect foresight is not
an implication of e¢ ciency. These papers demonstrate that with time separable utili-
ties, generically in endowments, there exists a one-dimensional set of e¢ cient temporary
equilibrium allocations (henceforth, ETE) around each PFE which are supported by het-
erogenous forecasts. These results indicate that requiring that markets allocate resources
e¢ ciently does not in any way pin down perfect foresight as the only conguration of
forecasts that is consistent with the e¢ ciency of equilibrium.
From another perspective, we may interpret these results as saying that the hy-
pothesis that markets allocate resources e¢ ciently, fails to provide a foundation for the
postulate of perfect foresight, and hence for RE. However, in the aforementioned works,
those forecasts that are implicit in supporting the one dimensional set of e¢ cient alloca-
tions, may be rather disparate across households and need not satisfy any self-fullling
property1; this leaves the possibility that requiring some weak form of the self-fullling
property of the forecasts that are used in supporting an ETE may lead one all the way
to perfect alignment of forecasts, that is, all the way to perfect foresight. If this were
true, e¢ ciency of markets along with some possibly weak requirement on the quality of
forecasts would pin down perfect foresight and provide thereby a foundation to RE.
Our investigation of a simple two period model with one good in each period reveals
that in general such a conclusion is not warranted. We proceed by proposing as our
solution concept a set of price forecasts with the following property: every households
1 In the Chatterji and Kajii (2020) paper, households may agree, and be correct, on the relative prices
being forecasted and disagree solely on the rate of ination.
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forecast is composed only of prices that correspond to e¢ cient equilibria. Moreover, such
a set of prices can be interpreted as a generalization of PFE to an e¢ cient equilibrium
with ambiguity, which proposes a set of e¢ cient equilibria that possess a self-fullling
property which is weaker than perfect foresight.
Notice that the set of all PFE of an economy trivially satisfy the requirements of
this proposed set. The contribution of this paper is then to show that there exists a
robust non-trivial case of economies where the proposed set di¤ers from the trivial ones.
We identify a condition on the slope of the local forecast functions (that are implied by
the analysis of the aforementioned papers) evaluated at the PFE, that ensures that one
may construct an interval of prices around a PFE that satises the requirements of our
proposed set. In particular, this interval contains non PFE prices that are consistent
with some e¢ cient equilibrium.
To summarize, the one dimensional set of e¢ cient equilibria around a PFE identied
in earlier work can be supported by a set of prices that possess a particular form of a
self-fullling property.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
reviews RE and e¢ cient equilibria. Section 3 notes a weak self-fullling property of
the e¢ cient equilibria while Section 4 proposes our notion of e¢ cient equilibrium with
ambiguity and illustrates using an example. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Denition
2.1 Setup
We consider an exchange economy as follows. There are two periods, period 0 and 1,
and there is one perishable consumption good in each period. We simply call the good
of the rst period good 0 and the good of the second period good 1.
There are H  1 households, labelled by h = 1; :::;H. Abusing notation we use
H for the set of households as well. Household h is endowed with e0h units of good
in the rst period (period 0) and e1h units in the second period (period 1). We write
eh =
 
e0h; e
1
h

. Household hs consumption set is R2+ with a generic element denoted by 
x0; x1

and its preferences for consumption bundles are represented by an increasing,
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continuous, and strictly concave utility function uh : R2+ ! R. We will allow random
consumption and households are assumed to be expected utility maximizers to evaluate
random consumption vectors. That is, if ~x1 is a non-negative random variable, the utility
from
 
x0; ~x1

is E

uh
 
x0; ~x1

,
Set et =
PH
h=1 e
t
h, for t = 0; 1; that is, e
t is the total supply of the good t, and we
assume et > 0 for both t. An allocation of goods,
 
x0h; x
1
h
H
h=1
2  R2+H , is feasible ifPH
h=1 x
t
h = e
t for t = 0; 1. When consumption is random, feasibility requires the equality
holds with probability one.
A feasible allocation is said to be Pareto e¢ cient if there is no alternative feasible
allocation which improves all households utility level. With a strict concave utility
function, every household is strictly risk averse, and hence an e¢ cient allocation must
necessarily be non-random since there is no uncertainty in the aggregate. Moreover,
when e0 = e1, a feasible allocation is e¢ cient if and only if every household consumes
the same amount in both periods, i.e., perfect consumption smoothing occurs.
Since we borrow the results from earlier papers which employ the standard technique
of genericity analysis, we assume in addition the following , although some of them are
not explicitly invoked in this paper: for every household h = 1; :::;H,
 utility function uh is C2 on R2++, @uh  0, and di¤erentiably strictly concave, and
each indi¤erence curve is closed in R2;
 initial endowments eh are strictly positive.
Furthermore, we x utility functions throughout, and identify an economy with its
initial endowments: so write E :=  R2++H and its generic element is denoted by e =
(   ; eh;    ). We say a subset of E is generic if it is open and its complement has
Lebesgue measure 0.
2.2 Temporary Equilibrium and Radner equilibrium
We begin by describing a model of perfect competition that does not impose a common
and correct forecast a priori.
In period 0, a riskless bond which pays o¤ 1 dollar in period 1 is traded competi-
tively. There is no default and no borrowing constraint. We may assume without loss of
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generality that the bond price is equal to the price of good 0, which is equal to one by
normalization. Writing zh for the amount of the bond held by household h, the choice
of consumption and saving is therefore subject to e0h   x0h = zh in period 0.
A forecast for the period 1 price is a positive random variable. Denote the set of all
forecasts by F . With a forecast ~ph 2 F , household h expects that the period 1 budget will
be ~ph
 
x1h   e1h
  zh. Since we have assumed strict monotonicity, all budget constraints
will be satised as equalities and thus his random consumption will be ~x1h = e
1
h + zh=~ph
with probability one. That is, he will choose x0h anticipating such a random consumption
~x1h. Equivalently, by elimination of zh, household h chooses x
0
h associated with a utility
maximizing random consumption
 
x0h; ~x
1
h

which satises the following budget constraint
with probability one:  
x0h   e0h

+ ~ph
 
~x1h   e1h

= 0: (1)
With a deterministic forecast, i.e., ~ph = p^h with probability one, the constraint may be
written as  
x0h   e0h

+ p^h
 
x^1h   e1h

= 0; (2)
where x^1h = e
1
h + zh=p^h.
We denote the realized market price of the good in period 1 by p, and then the
realized consumption path
 
x0h; x
1
h

must satisfy the following equation:
 
x0h   e0h

+ p
 
x1h   e1h

= 0: (3)
Of course, if ~ph = p with probability one, two budget equations (1) and (3) are identical
and so are the respective consumption choices. We write ~p for a prole of forecasts, i.e.,
~p = (   ; ~ph;    ). A temporary equilibrium consists of a prole of consumption bundles,
a prole of forecasts, and a market clearing price of the second period, formally dened
as follows:
Denition 1 A temporary equilibrium (TE) is a tuple (x; ~p; p) 2  R2++H(F)HR+
such that:
(i) x is a feasible allocation, i.e.,
PH
h=1 x

h =
PH
h=1 eh;
(ii) for each h 2 H, there exists a random variable ~x1h such that
 
x0h ; ~x
1
h

maximizes
utility under budget (1) given forecast ~ph;
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(iii) for each h 2 H, x1h maximizes uh
 
x0h ; 

under constraint (3) at p = p, and
x0h = x
0
h .
A temporary equilibrium is said to be a perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) if ~ph = p
holds with probability one for every household h
Given a TE (x; ~p; p), x is called a TE allocation and p is called a TE price,
which by denition clears the second period market. We refer to condition (ii) above as
justiability : we say a forecast ~ph justies consumption x0h if (ii) holds for household h,
since it means that the period 0 consumption can be explained by utility maximization
under the forecast. Since forecasts appear in (ii) only, if another forecast ~p0h justies the
same period 0 consumption for each h, (x; ~p0; p) constitutes a TE. It can be readily seen
that there is a large variety of random forecasts which justies the same consumption,
and hence there is a large indeterminacy about forecasts for a TE (x; ~p; p).
With slight abuse of notation, when ~ph = p^h 2 R+ with probability one for every
h, i.e., every household has a point forecast, we write (x; p^; p) where p^ = (p^h)Hh=1, and
we shall further simplify it to (x; p) when p^ = p, i.e., every households point forecast
agrees with the market price, to economize notation. In particular, note that anticipated
consumption ~x1h is non random in a PFE, and must coincide with x
1
h . Thus in e¤ect, if
a TE is a PFE, every household anticipates the future consumption correctly and so a
PFE will be written as (x; p). Since the two constraints (1) and (3) coincide at a PFE,
it is readily seen that a PFE is equivalent to an Arrow Debreu equilibrium where two
goods are simultaneously traded.
The PFE is an instance of a Radner Equilibrium (henceforth RE) which, as is well
known, is dened more generally so as to apply to incomplete market settings as well.
The key feature of a RE is that rational expectations is assumed rather than derived, and
hence the concept hinges on the exact coordination of household forecasts at particular
self-fulllingprice, which in our simple setting, is equivalent to rational expectations.
Our intention here is to re-examine the content of the assumption of rational expecta-
tions, and to that end we propose a more permissive equilibrium notion than a RE that
allows heterogenous forecasts while retaining the self-fullling feature of forecasts in a
somewhat weaker form.
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The underlying postulate in our analysis is that dynamic trading activities will take
place until gains from trade are exhausted. In other words, just as perfect competition
based on price taking behavior is intended to be an as-ifstory to formalize anonymous
and voluntary trading of many economic agents, we seek such an as-if story to formalize
the exhaustion of gainful trading opportunities. Towards this purpose, instead of impos-
ing rational expectations, we impose rather the e¢ ciency of the resulting allocation: our
notion will draw upon the idea of an e¢ cient temporary equilibrium.
2.3 E¢ cient Temporary Equilibria
Let p be a PFE price and x be the associated allocation, and assume xh 6= eh for
every h. It can be shown2 that such PFE exist and are locally unique, generically in
endowments under our assumptions.
Note that by revealed preference, uh (xh) > uh (eh) for every h. That is, a PFE is
individually rational. On the other hand, a TE might not be individually rational, since
households do not necessarily anticipate the correct constraint. Note however that a
temporary equilibrium also exhibits individual rationality if the resulting allocation is
close enough to such a PFE allocation. Thus we shall focus mostly on TE close to a
PFE.
A PFE is self-selective in the sense that no household prefers a net trade of another
household to its own. This is simply a consequence of utility maximization on a com-
mon set of budget feasible net trade. A TE still exhibits similar self-selectiveness at
their respective forecasts: no household prefers a saving/borrowing position of another
household, given its forecasts.
By the rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics, a PFE allocation is an e¢ cient
allocation. Given our postulate, a natural preliminary question to ask here is if there is
an e¢ cient TE other than PFE. The answer turns out to be generically yes.
Denition 2 An e¢ cient temporary equilibrium (ETE) is a temporary equilibrium
(x; ~p; p) where the consumption allocation x is Pareto e¢ cient.
Under our assumptions, Chatterji, Kajii and Zeng (2018b) demonstrate essentially
2For instance, Mas-Colell (1985).
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the following 3:
Proposition 3 (Chatterji, Kajii and Zeng (2018b)) There is a generic set E  E such
that for each e 2 E, (i) there are nitely many PFE, (ii) for each PFE allocation
x 2  R2++H , there is a one dimensional C1 manifold of ETE allocations containing x
parameterized by the ETE price p around the respective PFE price, and (iii) there is for
each h, a unique deterministic forecast parameterized by the ETE price p which justies
the ETE allocation.
ETE will serve as the basis for two notions of Self-fullling ETE that we now turn
to.
3 Weakly Self-fullling E¢ cient Temporary Equilibrium
As we noted earlier, the precise connection between PFE and ETE will hinge on the
quality of forecasts, that is, whether or not the forecasts justifying the householdsperiod
0 consumption has some self-fullling quality.
Denition 4 A prole of forecasts ~p is weakly self-fullling at p if p belongs to the
support of ~ph, for every h.
That is, a random forecast is weakly self-fullling if it does not rule out the price
to be realized in the market. This seems to be the minimal consistency requirement
for a reasonable forecast. In what follows, we argue that any ETE allocation with
deterministic forecasts arises with weakly self-fullling random forecasts. Let (x; p^; p)
be an ETE where p^ = (p^h)
H
h=1 is a prole of deterministic forecasts. Note that forecasts
matter only to the extent of justifying period 0 consumption for each household (i.e.,
in condition (ii) of Denition 1). Thus it su¢ ces to construct a random forecast which
assumes p with positive probability and which justies the same period 0 consumption.
Given the large degree of freedom about random forecasts, we will focus on simple
binary random forecasts which are weakly self-fullling.
3Their main result is not stated in this way exactly, but we shall omit a proof since this result can be
readily established by a close examination of their analysis with a help of a more general analysis carried
out in Chatterji and Kajii (2020).
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Denition 5 A prole of forecasts ~p is said to be binary if the support of ~ph consists of
at most two points for every h.
It will be convenient (omitting the subscript h to simplify notation) to denote v (a; b) :=
u
 
e0 + a; e1 + b

. From the utility maximization problem of a household, let z^ = e0 x0
be the optimal saving at the deterministic forecast p^. Finally, let
kz^(q) :=  va ( z^; qz^) + vb ( z^; qz^) q: (4)
That is, kz^(q) is the marginal utility from saving and kz^(q) = 0 will constitute the
relevant rst order condition for consumption choice at price p, where q = 1p .
The following result, which asserts in addition that the random forecast takes a value
closer to the original deterministic forecast, is stronger than is necessary in this context,
but will turn out to be useful in the next section. To see how it works, notice that the
expected marginal utility from saving at a random forecast is the expectation of marginal
utilities for forecasted prices. So a household will save the same amount at a random
forecast as it does at a deterministic forecast, if the expectation of marginal utilities
is kept the same. Starting with an ETE (x; p^; p) where p^ = (p^h)Hh=1 is a prole of
deterministic forecasts, we will modify the forecast so that the ETE price p occurs with
a small positive probability. The expected marginal utilities would remain the same if
the marginal utility from the deterministic forecast can be adjusted to o¤set the change
induced by the ETE price. The Lemma below shows that unless the marginal utility of
saving at the deterministic forecast is insensitive to a price change, such a construction
can be done.
Lemma 6 Suppose
 
x0; x^1

maximizes utility under budget (2) given a deterministic
forecast p^. Assume that dk
z^(q^)
dq 6= 0 and let p 6= p^ be any price with kz^(q) 6= 0, where
q^ = 1=p^ and q = 1=p.
Then for any  > 0, there exists a non-degenerate random forecast ~p, which takes values
p and p0 where jp^  p0j < , such that  x0; ~x1 maximizes utility under budget (1).
Proof. Recall that z^ = e0 x0 is the optimal saving at the deterministic forecast p^. We
shall seek a random forecast which assigns probability " to p and 1   " to p0 which is
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close to p^. For given p0 > 0 and "  0, consider the problem of maximizing the objective
function by choice of z, where q0 = 1=p0, under such a random forecast:
u

e0   z; e1 + z
p0

(1  ") + u

e0   z; e1 + z
p

" = v
  z; q0z (1  ") + v ( z; qz) "
It is a concave problem, and the rst order necessary and su¢ cient condition is

 
z; q0; "

:=
  va   z; q0z+ vb   z; q0z q0 (1  ")+( va ( z; qz) + vb ( z; qz) q) " = 0;
where va and vb are the respective partial derivatives. Notice that  (z; q0; 0) = kz^(q0) by
construction.
By hypothesis, z^ is an optimal choice when (q0; ") = (q^; 0), so we have
 (z^; q^; 0) =  va ( z^; q^z^) + vb ( z^; q^z^) q^
= 0;
and are done if we can nd (q0; ") with q0 > 0 and 0 < " < 1 such that  (z^; q0; ") = 0.
Di¤erentiating  (z^; q0; ") with respect to " and q0 respectively, and evaluating these
at " = 0 and q0 = q^, recalling that kz^(q0)   va ( z^; q0z^) + vb ( z^; q0z^) q0 =  (z^; q0; 0),
and kz^(q^) = 0, we nd that
@
@"
 (z^; q^; 0) =   ( va ( z^; q^z) + vb ( z^; q^z) q^) + ( va ( z^; qz) + vb ( z^; qz^) q)
=  kz^(q^) + kz^ (q)
= kz^ (q) ;
and,
@
@q0
 (z^; q^; 0) =
dkz^ (q^)
dq0
:
Our assumptions that kz^ (q) 6= 0 and dkz^(q^)dq0 6= 0, allow us to apply the Implicit Function
Theorem and obtain the local solution " (q0) around q^ that satises

 
z^; q0; "
 
q0

= 0
and whose derivative is
@" (z^; q^; 0)
@q0
=  
dkz^(q^)
dq0
kz^ (q)
6= 0:
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If @"(z^;q^;0)@q0 > 0 (resp, < 0), then for q
0 > q^ (resp, < 0) such that jq0 < q^j is small
enough, we have 1 > " (q0) > 0 as required to complete the proof.
For an ETE (x; p^; p) 2  R2++H  (R+)H  R+, write zh  e0h   x0h , and dene
function k
zh
h analogously to (4) for each household h. Then we establish the following:
Proposition 7 Let (x; p^; p) 2  R2++H  (R+)H  R+ be an ETE with deterministic
forecasts. Suppose that for each household h, either p^h = p or
dkz^h(1=p^h)
dq 6= 0 holds. Then
there is a prole of binary random forecasts, ~p, such that (x; ~p; p) constitutes an ETE
where for every h, ~ph is weakly self-fullling at p.
Proof. If p^h = p, just let ~ph be the deterministic forecast p^h itself. If p^h 6= p and
kz^(1=p) = 0, then household hs demand at the ETE is justied at p as well, so set
~ph be the deterministic forecast p. If p^h 6= p and kz^(1=p) 6= 0, apply Lemma 6 to
obtain a binary forecast ~ph which is weakly self-fullling. By construction, for each h,
~ph assigns strictly positive property to p as required.
4 Equilibrium with price ambiguity
In the elaboration of ETE thus far, households are required to have a forecast but the
process of forecasting is not structured. The classical literature4 assumes an exogenous
ad hoc forecasting rule but that is not the path we would like to pursue. Instead, we
propose a concept of two-step forecasting which can serve as a particular formulation of
self-fullling expectations.
Specically, we assert that each household rst identies a set of possible market
prices, h, and then assigns probabilities on those prices to create a forecast, ~ph. We
then ask when the set of possible market prices can be deemed self-fullling.
First, no price in h should be ruled out in period 0, or else h would contain
infeasible prices; that is, for any p 2 h there should be a weakly self-fullling ETE
(x; ~p; p), i.e., each households period 0 choice is justied with a weakly self-fullling
forecast, ~ph. Secondly, the forecast should not assign any probability to impossible
prices; that is, it is additionally required that ~ph 2 h occurs with probability one.
4Grandmont (1977, 2008), Radner (1982), among others.
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Thirdly, we ask that these sets are common across the households to require alignment
of set valued forecasts. Thus formally, we dene a self-fullling price set as follows:
Denition 8 A subset  of prices (R+) is said to be a self-fullling set of price forecasts
if for any p 2  there is a weakly self fullling ETE (x; ~p; p) such that for every h, ~ph 2 
holds with probability one.
As we argued earlier, ETE takes the point of view that e¢ ciency is more primitive
than rational expectations about prices. Here we propose a self-fullling set of price
forecasts as a sort of hybrid between the RE and ETE. That is, e¢ cient allocations
can be decentralized with heterogenous forecasts while retaining a form of self-fullling
property on a consistent set of price expectations.
A self-fullling set of price forecasts may also be interpreted as an equilibrium with
ambiguity, which does not predict a particular conguration of the market price and
transactions, but rather o¤ers candidates with a self-fullling property, but without
probabilistic details of forecasts and random quantities.
A set of PFE prices constitute a self-fullling set. Indeed, let  be such a set. Then
by construction, for any p 2 , there is a PFE which is an instance of an ETE with a
common price forecast ~ph = p, and trivially ~ph 2  holds with probability one for every
h.
It is of interest to ask if a self fullling set of price forecasts must necessarily be of
this form: if so, then the idea of rational expectations can be justied without imposing
a common deterministic forecast.
We shall argue that there is a robust class of economies where there exists a self-
fullling set of price forecasts containing prices other hand PFE prices. We give a
general illustration of the idea rst, and then examine an example.
4.1 A general construction method
We x a generic economy and write p for a locally unique PFE price of this economy
where Proposition 3 applies. Let h be the forecast function which maps each ETE price
p around p to household hs deterministic forecast p^h. The analysis of CKZ (2018b)
further reveals that h is a continuously di¤erentiable function locally dened around p
12
and satises h(p) = p. We let q(p) = 1p and x(p) and z(p) = e
0 x0(p) denote the ETE
allocation and saving respectively, locally parameterized by p. For convenience we write
q = q(p), z = z(p). Finally, let q^h(p) = 1h(p)
If every forecast function h is a local contraction around p, we can construct a
self-fullling set  which is an interval around p containing non PFE prices, provided a
regularity condition hold at p. A formal statement is given below.
Claim 9 Suppose for each household h, we have (i) dk
zh
h (q)
dq 6= 0 and (ii)  1 < dh(p)dp < 1
holds. Then there exists an interval  containing p that forms a self-fullling set of price
forecasts.
To verify the claim, note that under the hypothesis, for each h, there exists h with
0 < h < 1 and h > 0 such that for any  0h < h , h(p) 2 [h(p  0h); h(p+ 0h)] whenever
p 2 [p   0h; p+  0h]. Let  = min fh : h = 1; :::;Hg and  = max fh : h = 1; :::;Hg < 1.
Set I1 := (p  ; p+ ). Furthermore, since dk
zh
h (q)
dq 6= 0 and k
zh(p)
h () are smooth for
every h, there exists an interval I2 around p such that dk
zh(p)
h (q^h(p))
dq 6= 0 in I2. In
particular, in conjunction with the fact that kzh(p)h (q^h(p)) = 0 at any p around p, and
the fact kzh(p)h (q) = 0 has a unique solution, I2 can be chosen so that for every h,
k
zh(p)
h (q(p)) 6= 0 holds whenever q(p) 6= q^h(p) in 8p 2 I2 . Finally, set  := I1 \ I2.
Then by construction, for any p 2 [p   ; p + ], h(p) 2 [h(p    0h); h(p +  0h)] 
[(p ); (p+)]   holds for any h. That is, h(p) is an interior point of . Moreover,
by the construction of I1, for any p 2 , p 6= p implies that h(p) 6= p holds for every
h. Next, observe that if h(p) 6= p, then q^h(p) 6= q(p), which in turn implies that
kzh(p) (q(p)) 6= 0 by the construction of I2. We may now apply Lemma 6 to construct
a binary random forecast ~ph which takes p and a value close to h(p) in , with which
household h demands the same amount as with h(p). Then we have a weakly self-
fullling ETE (x; ~p; p) where each forecast ~ph takes a value in  with probability one.
Therefore,  is a self fullling set of price forecasts.
We shall illustrate these ideas using an example below, which also serves as an in-
stance of a robust economy where a non-trivial self-fullling set of price forecasts exists.
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4.2 An example
The following is the specication of the example which is borrowed from Chatterji, Kajii,
Zeng (2018b).
 H = f1; 2; 3g.
 Endowments: e1 = (2  "; "); e2 = ("0; 2  "0) and e3 =
 
1 + ("  "0); 1 + ("  "0),
where 0 < "; "0 < 1 are given parameters. Note that
PH
h=1 e
0
h = 3 and
PH
h=1 e
1
h = 3.
 For each h 2 H, uh(x0h; x1h) = lnx0h + lnx1h.
As in the main analysis, we set period-0 price equal to one and the interest rate equal
to zero, and write p^1; p^2; p^3 > 0 for the deterministic forecasts of the households.
Since the aggregate endowment is the same in both period, a feasible allocation is
e¢ cient if and only if it exhibits perfect consumption smoothing. Thus, for all those
economies parameterized by " and "0, the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations is
P =

(x0h; x
1
h)
H
h=1 2 R23+
(x0h; x1h) = h(1; 1); h  0 for all h 2 H; and XHh=1 h = 1

:
so in particular, the initial endowments are not Pareto e¢ cient. It is readily seen that
the unique PFE, occurs at p = 1, with the allocation xh = (1; 1) for every h 2 H.
Finding an ETE is cumbersome but it is straightforward enough.5 If we set the
forecast functions as: for p close enough to p = 1,
1(p)  p^1 = 2  "
"
1  p
1 + p
+
2p
1 + p
; (5)
2(p)  p^2 = "
0
2  "0
1  p
1 + p
+
2p
1 + p
; and (6)
3(p)  p^3 = 1 + ("  "
0)
1  ("  "0)
1  p
1 + p
+
2p
1 + p
; (7)
then

(h (p))
3
h=1 ; p

constitute deterministic ETE forecasts and an ETE price. In par-
ticular, forecast functions (h)
3
h=1 are exactly the ones discussed in the general analysis
in the previous subsection. It can be veried by computation that their derivatives at
the PFE price p = 1 are
0h (1) =
1  h
2
; h = 1; 2; 3;
5More details can be found in Chatterji, Kajii, Zeng (2018b).
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where 1 = 2 "" , 2 =
"0
2 "0 and 3 =
1+(" "0)
1 (" "0) .
It is readily veried that the condition dk
zh
h (q
)
dq 6= 0 required in the Claim in the
previous subsection holds since the derivative in question is e
1
h
(x1h )2
.
We now examine two special cases of interest.
(i) Assume " = "0 = 0:7. It can be readily checked that household 3 does not trade at
the PFE and 03 (1) = 0. Furthermore, 01 (1) =  37 and 02 (1) = 313 . Therefore, in this
economy, we have the conguration  1 < 0h (p) < 1 for every h. Following the general
argument, one can nd an interval  containing p = 1 that forms a self-fullling set of
price forecasts. Since all the relevant functions are continuous, the conclusion remains
valid for values of " and "0 that are close to 0:7 and possibly di¤erent, i.e., the example
is robust. In particular, household 3 not trading at the PFE is not essential in the
construction.
(ii) Assume " = "0 = 0:2. It can be readily seen that household 3 does not trade
at the PFE and 03 (1) = 0. Furthermore, 01 (1) =  4 and 02 (1) = 49 . Therefore this
economy does not have the conguration  1 < 0h (p) < 1 for all h = 1; :::;H, and hence
the construction method does not work.
5 Concluding Remarks
The idea of a self-fullling set of price forecasts is not conned to the simple setup we
considered in this paper. Although we do not elaborate on it formally here, it is rather
straightforward to state it when there are multiple goods in each period. We believe that
an extension of the idea to multiple periods can also be done.
We conjecture that the construction method we have outlined above can be gen-
eralized to economies with multiple goods in each period. It would be interesting to
investigate conditions under which one may generate self-fullling sets of price forecasts
in these general set ups.
In the second case in the previous subsection, it appears that the only possible
candidate for  is the singleton set containing the PFE price. Although we have no
formal apparatus to verify this non-existence claim, it nonetheless seems that in this
economy, the set valued self-fullling property is enough to rule out any ETE which does
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not exhibit perfect foresight. One may further interpret this observation as saying that
common knowledge of e¢ ciency and decentralization with price expectations with a
self-fullling property must necessarily induce perfect foresight. It would be of interest
to formalize this observation as a way of providing a foundation to the axiom of rational
expectations.
At any rate, the analysis provided in this paper, despite its rudimental nature, o¤ers
an avenue for exploring the extent to which the essence of Radner equilibrium can be
separated from the rational expectations paradigm. We contend that it gives not only
a new foundation based on e¢ ciency and decentralized spot markets, but also an inter-
esting way to extend the concept of Radner equilibrium to allow ambiguity about future
prices while retaining a form of self-fullling prophecy.
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